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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A company’s ability to initiate a dividend is a key 
aspect that is usually examined by shareholders and 
any potential investor (Kapoor et al., 2010). A solid 
dividend policy is a crucial consideration for 
investors who attribute importance to a firm’s profit 
stability. Thus, improved dividends can act as a 
signal regarding the company’s overall health as per 
signaling theory. Despite prior research attempting 
to address the enigma of dividend policy, the 
reasons behind the existence of different dividend 
policies among firms are still not fully explained 
(Black, 1976; Baker et al., 2001 and Dewasiri and 
Weerakoon-Banda, 2016). Various explanations have 
been proposed in the literature in order to 
comprehend corporate dividend policy. However, no 
consensus regarding the explanations provided has 
been reached among researchers except for an 
agreement that dividend policy is key and one of the 
most frequently-observed actions in corporations 
globally. 
Without a doubt, dividend policy is still one of 
the most divisive and puzzling topics within 
corporate finance literature. Miller and Modigliani 
(1958 and 1961) first set out the theoretical 
grounding (M&M) for research into dividend policy 
claiming that in perfect markets, dividend policy has 
no influence on the value of a company. They 
assumed that the investment of a company is fixed, 
therefore, irrespective of dividend policy, its entire 
current positive net value ventures will be funded. 
Higher ratios of dividend payout result in lower 
capital gains i.e. retained earnings, and vice versa, 
meaning that the wealth of shareholders is 
unaffected. Lintner (1956) opposed this theory and 
showed that companies in the US adhere to a 
dividend policy that is adaptive through subjecting 
their pay-outs to smoothing. Lintner noted that 
organizations preserve a target ratio of dividend 
pay-out and adapt their dividends policy in relation 
to this target. He also stated that companies follow a 
dividend policy that is stable and raise dividends 
over time in line with the target ratio of pay-out. 
Brav et al., (2005) further supported the idea of 
dividend stability and found that keeping dividends 
at a certain level is a huge concern for US firms in 
relation to investment decisions. Moreover, more 
recent empirical studies have provided support for 
the existence of dividend smoothing among 
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companies at different levels affected by different 
factors, e.g., size, age, ownership structure and tax 
regimes (Stevens and Jose, 1992; Lasfer, 1996; 
Gwilym et al., 2000; Block, 2008; Al-Yahyaee et al., 
2010 and Javakhadze et al., 2014). On the other 
hand, other researchers, such as Basse, et al., 2014, 
concerning the European-banking industry, found 
that dividend smoothing is irrelevant empirically. 
The bulk of this research was conducted on 
non-financial organizations in countries that are 
developed. This logically drives us to question 
whether these dividend policies based on stability 
are unique to developed countries or if they also 
have prominence in countries in which the 
institutional and economic characteristics and/or 
the tax regime differ significantly. Therefore, the 
purpose of this study is to analyze whether the 
banking sector in six emerging economies (GCC 
countries) smooths their dividends via employing 
the partial adjustment model in comparison to 
seven developed economies (G-7 countries). It 
evaluates whether banks in the GCC have a different 
dividend pay-out policy than banks in G-7 countries 
(e.g.: Italy, France, Canada, Germany, Japan, the UK, 
and the USA). A number of significant economic and 
institutional characteristics make the GCC a unique 
context in order to analyze dividend policy stability. 
Finally, the study will analyze the impact of factors 
that have been demonstrated to affect banks’ 
dividend behaviors operating in developed 
economies. After this, the results from the emerging 
market firms sample will be compared with the 
sample from the developed banks during the same 
period in order for inferences to be drawn in 
relation to the significance of features of financial 
and institutional market development linked with 
decisions about dividends. This emphasizes the 
significance of institutional features in relation to 
dividend policy and provides an understanding of 
the role played by environmental and firm-relevant 
factors in formulating dividend policy.   
This research is undertaken in an environment 
with an idiosyncratic feature that is no taxes levied 
on capital gains and dividends (Al-Yahyaee et al., 
2014). A major component of the dividend puzzle is 
tax differentials. This varies greatly to the G-7 
countries that traditionally have been taxing 
dividends at an increased rate in comparison to 
capital gains. The lack of taxation in the GCC thus 
might have an effect on the stability of dividends. 
For instance, Rozycki (1997) showed that managers 
are motivated to smooth dividend payments if they 
have personal income taxes. He provided evidence 
that the smoothing of dividends has increased a tax-
paying investor’s wealth by lowering the current 
value of their future anticipated income tax 
commitments. As a result, the fact that there are no 
personal income taxes in the GCC is thought to 
lessen the significance of dividend stability. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Theories of dividend policy 
 
There are several theories that were developed to 
understand the reasons behind having different 
dividend policies among companies. These are the 
irrelevance theorem of Miller and Modigliani (1958), 
bird-in-the-hand, signaling, firm life cycle theory, 
Agency cost theory, tax-preference theory, and 
transaction cost theory. This section, however, 
focuses on explaining only the main theories. 
MM’s theory states that investment policy and 
nothing else is what determines the wealth of 
stockholders in markets that have no friction. 
Additionally, pay-out choices and leverage have no 
influence on the value of a firm, particularly if a 
value-maximizing programme of investment is in 
place (see, e.g., Allen and Michael (2003, p.339)). In 
other words, when considering various pay-out and 
beverage choices, the firm is basically slicing a pie 
which is fixed (in terms of investment cash flows) 
into various pieces, in which each individual value, 
in relation to the frictionless markets, inevitably add 
up to the whole value generated from the underlying 
policy of investment. Since the development of the 
M&M theorem, many alterations have been made to 
it and further empirical research undertaken in 
relation to it. Modigliani (1982) later admitted that 
the initial irrelevance theory’s assumptions could 
not be applied in reality and were too abstract. A 
minor correction was made in 1963 by the same 
economists for including tax savings into the model, 
which was related to the rise in levels of debt. 
Moreover, Modigliani (1982) suggested that the 
firm’s value would be reduced by dividend payouts, 
although the impact would actually only be slight if 
the rate of tax was capitalized at a risky rate instead 
of a prevailing market rate. Further, the tax clientele 
influence needs to be considered, for instance, if the 
investors’ tax brackets increase, they would 
consequently invest larger amounts in portfolios 
with shares paying out low dividends.  
In contrary to MM’s theory, the bird-in-hand 
theory demonstrates that shareholders tend to be 
averse to risk and thus prefer not to wait a long 
period and have access to instant dividends (Gordon, 
1959). Therefore, in the future, it is anticipated that 
dividends will be more desirable over capital gains, 
particularly to those who possess a risk-averse 
attitude. Consequently, metaphorically, a bird in the 
hand dividend is preferable to a bird in the bush 
capital gains. Based on that, Bhattacharya (1979) 
further claimed that stockholders are open to paying 
a share premium for increased dividend shares.  
Finally, Miller and Rock (1985) suggested that 
costly dividends can be utilized as signals in the 
case of asymmetric information among internal 
management and shareholders. Therefore, this 
signaling could aid with determining good 
companies who possess potential future earning 
power from firms who do not (bad firms). If this 
signaling works successfully, then, in turn, there 
should be a positive influence on the share price. 
This theory’s basis comes from Lintner’s study 
(1956), which identified that dividends were not only 
dependent upon the cash necessary to fund projects 
on a short-term basis, yet further, they illustrated 
the beliefs of management in relation to the 
sustainability of the firm’s earnings on a long-term 
basis. Therefore, managers usually initiate or raise 
pay-outs only if they believe that future earnings will 
be high. Several sources of empirical evidence 
suggest that investors regard dividend initiations 
and increase favorably; hence, there tends to be an 
increase in firms’ stock prices close to the time 
initiations are announced (Miller and Rock, 1985; 
Gunasekarage and Power, 2002; and Al-Kilani et al., 
2012). A recent study by Jabbouri and Attar (2017) 
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also asserted empirically that companies listed on 
Casablanca Stock Exchange, which pay high rate of 
dividend, signal a low level of their agency costs as 
well as low level of information asymmetries that 
reflects their financial efficiency. 
 
2.2. Development of research hypotheses  
 
A company’s dividend policy is considered a 
significant issue in the corporate finance literature 
not only for the company itself (through its 
influence on e.g., capital structure, cash flow, value, 
and growth rate) but also across a wide spectrum of 
stakeholders, market activities and economic state. 
Accordingly, scholars have conducted many studies 
trying to understand theoretically and empirically 
the complexity of this phenomenon by examining it 
in association with a wide range of factors. Some of 
them are related to the company while others are 
linked to environmental and institutional variables 
surrounding companies. Company dividend policy 
represented mainly by dividend payout ratio has 
been examined in respect of e.g., firm size, growth 
rate, leverage, profitability, lagged dividend, national 
culture, creditor’s rights, gender diversity and 
ownership structure (Gugler, 2003; Naceur et al., 
2006; Shao et al., 2010; Al-Kuwari, 2009; Thanatawe, 
2011; Ansary and Gomaa, 2012; Zameer et al., 2013; 
Malkawi et al., 2014; Ahmed, 2015; Vo, 2015; AL-
Dhamari, et al., 2016; Al-Amarneh et al., 2017 and 
Byrne and O’Connor, 2017). The dividend payout 
ratio is the dependent variable employed in this 
research. Further, the formula provided by Gill et al., 
(2009) was utilized by which dividend pay-out ratio= 
dividend per share/ earning per share (EPS). 
Moreover, this same formula has been employed in 
other research (Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; 
Amidu and Abor 2006). Due to data availability 
factors, especially regarding GCC, the researchers 
restricted the study to examine the impact of five 
explanatory variables that are considered the main 
influential factors on dividend policy according to 
the literature review. A mix of financial and non-
financial factors was examined in the study. They 
are related to the characteristics of the companies 
studied, namely, firm size, leverage, profitability, 
growth, and previous year’s dividend payment. 
 
2.2.1. Firm size 
 
A number of studies have examined the effect of 
firm size on the dividend-agency relationship. They 
identified that firm size was a significant 
explanatory variable, as bigger companies tend to 
raise their dividend pay-outs in order to lower 
agency costs (Holder et al., 1998; Baker et al., 2001; 
DeAngelo et al., 2006; Denis and Osobov, 2008). 
Fama and French (2001) stated that larger firms 
disseminate an increased volume of their net profits 
as cash dividends than smaller firms do. Ringane 
and Makoni (2014) identified the factors affecting 
the dividend policy of companies listed on the JSE in 
South Africa and found firm size as one of the 
positively influential factors. Furthermore, in a study 
applied to 646 companies in GCC, Kumar and Sujit 
(2016) found that larger firms had higher levels of 
dividend payout than smaller companies. They 
attributed these results to the fact that large size 
firms tend to have higher retained cash flows. 
However, few other studies concluded a negative 
association between firm size and dividend payout 
ratio. Ahmad et al. (2018) supported such a negative 
relationship between size and dividend yield in 
Euronext 100 index. They justified their findings by 
the fact that large firms often need an extra fund for 
expansion leading to decreasing their dividend on 
expense of the retained profit. Information 
asymmetry is higher in larger firms because of the 
dispersion of ownership, hence lowering the 
shareholders’ capacity to regulate the firm’s internal 
and external activities, leading to ineffective 
management control. The solution here can be 
paying out large dividends, which increases the 
necessity for external funding leading to enhanced 
monitoring of larger firms due to the presence of 
creditors. In this context, Sawicki (2005) 
demonstrated that dividend pay-outs can indirectly 
aid with the monitoring of managers’ performance 
in larger companies. There are various 
measurements of firm size, for example, total 
employment, total assets, total revenue, and 
capitalization. In this research, the natural logarithm 
of companies’ total assets is utilized as a measure 
for size. This measure has commonly been 
employed by earlier studies such as Gill et al., 
(2009). Based on the aforementioned discussion and 
in line with prior empirical studies, the company’s 
size is anticipated to have a positive correlation with 
dividend pay-outs. Thus, the hypothesis in relation 
to firm size is devised: 
H1: Banks’ size has a significant positive impact 
on the dividend policy. 
 
2.2.2. Leverage 
 
A firm’s capital structure comprises of both debt 
(e.g., loans and bonds) and equity financing (e.g., 
shares). The debt to total assets ratio is a financial 
ratio that signifies the comparative percentage of 
debt utilized to fund the company’s assets. Most of 
the studies examining the impact of this factor 
concluded its significant negative association with 
the rate of dividend payout (e.g., Pruitt and Gitman 
1991; Al-Twaijry, 2007 and Jabbouri, 2016). Several 
reasons were offered by the scholars for justifying 
the existence of such a relationship. Firms who have 
increasing debt rates usually have a lower dividend 
payout ratio to be able to cover the interest of their 
debt (Gugler and Yurtoglu, 2003 and Afza and 
Hammad, 2011). Additionally, companies relying on 
debts to fund their projects usually suffer a high 
level of financial risk making the option of external 
funding costly. Therefore, they become more reliant 
on internal funds i.e., retained profit (Faccio et al., 
1996). Another interpretation is related to the debt 
covenant that sometimes limits the ability of a 
borrowing company to pay-out dividends (Mather 
and Peirson, 2006). Leverage is one of the factors 
observed excessively in terms of its relationship 
with companies’ dividend policy. Older studies, such 
as Lloyd et al., (1985) and D’Souza (1999) also 
indicated that highly levered firms aim to maintain 
their internal cash flow for satisfying duties, rather 
than sharing available cash with shareholders and 
safeguarding their creditors. Lee (2014) examined 
the impact of banks’ characteristics in Korea on 
their dividend payout policy. The research found 
that banks with higher debt rates usually have a 
weak capital adequacy leading to paying fewer 
dividends. Recently, Jabbouri (2016) analyzed 
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dividend policy in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and identified the main determinants 
affecting it including financial leverage. The study 
employed a sample of firms listed in 11 stock 
markets of 10 MENA countries over the period 
between 2004 and 2013. The study revealed, 
similarly to the literature, that leverage has a sign 
opposite impact on companies’ ability to pay out 
dividends to their shareholders. Finally, Al-Sabah 
(2015) found also a negative influence of companies’ 
leverage on their dividend payout ratio in Kuwait. In 
line with the arguments above, the following 
hypothesis can be devised for further examination: 
H2: Banks’ leverage has a significant negative 
influence on the dividend policy. 
 
2.2.3. Profitability 
 
A number of surveys have provided useful insights 
into which factors financial managers believe to be 
the most significant in deciding upon the dividend 
policy of their firm. Profitability is one of the factors 
that have been tested extensively in terms of the 
dividend policy of both financial and non-financial 
institutions. Almost all the previous studies 
confirmed the significant positive influence of 
bank’s profitability on its dividends payout. Farrelly 
et al., (1986) surveyed 562 firms with so-called 
“normal” dividend policies and established that the 
key determinants of dividend were the expected 
level of future earnings and past dividends patterns. 
In addition, Pruitt and Gitman (1991) demonstrated 
that key effects on the volume of dividends paid out 
were the year to year variability of earnings, current 
and past years’ profits, and the growth in earnings. 
Baker and Powell (2000) identified the key factors 
impacting on a company’s dividend policy including 
the pattern of past dividends and the level of 
current and anticipated future earnings. Another 
study in the U.S. financial sector conducted by Abreu 
and Gulamhussen (2013) reported a positive impact 
of 462 banks’ profitability on their dividend payouts 
before and during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In 
Asia, both Lee (2014) in Korea and Ahmad and 
Muqaddas (2017) in Pakistan also found evidence 
supporting the significant positive role played by 
profitability on banks’ dividends payout ratio. 
Finally, a recent study by Baker et al., (2018) in 
Turkey asserted also that profitability represented 
by current and future earnings affect significantly 
the dividend policy. In line with the above, 
profitability is anticipated to be a major determinant 
of banking dividend policy. In order to test this 
hypothesis, net income to the total asset (return on 
assets) is employed as a measure of the profitability 
of a firm. The relationship hypothesized among 
dividends and profitability is positive. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis can be devised: 
H3: Banks’ profitability has a significant positive 
influence on the dividend policy. 
 
2.2.4. Growth 
 
Miller & Modigliani (1961) proposed that corporate 
investment and dividend payout decisions are 
independent in perfect capital markets. Yet, when 
market imperfections are present, such as agency 
costs, taxes and flotation costs, both investment and 
dividend choices may be closely linked or 
interdependent. That is because when a firm decides 
to pay out dividends, it is effectively forsaking a 
comparatively cheap indigenous source of financing. 
This means that the firm will need to involve other 
sources of finance such as issuing a new equity or a 
debt security, which are considered more risky and 
high-cost, for any expansion opportunity. 
Investments and dividends are in competition for 
restricted and lower-cost internal funds (Elston, 
1996). To test if opportunities for investment affect 
dividend policy, a suitable proxy needs to be 
selected. A number of studies have found that the 
rate of growth was frequently utilized as a proxy 
variable for measuring the growth opportunities in 
regard to the relationship between dividend and 
investment policy. The rate of growth is measured in 
the literature mainly by looking at the annual 
historical growth of total assets/sales (Boldin and 
Leggett, 1995 and Theis and Dutta, 2009) or through 
calculating M/B ratio i.e. market to book value of the 
equity (Collins et al., 1994 and Theis and Dutta, 
2009). This study, however, adopted the second tool 
(M/B ratio) due to data availability in respect of GCC. 
Higgins (1972) argued that a firm's necessity to fund 
growth opportunities has a negative correlation with 
a payout ratio. Lloyd et al., (1985) and Amidu and 
Abor (2006) also identified a significant negative 
correlation between historical sales growth and 
dividend payout. Similarly, Lee (2011) found that 
future opportunity of growth affects negatively the 
ability of national Korean banks to pay dividend. 
Finally, Abreu and Gulamhussen (2013) concluded 
that banks with a low growth rate in U.S. usually pay 
more dividends to their shareholders. Hence, a 
negative correlation between sales growth and 
dividend pay-outs is anticipated. The following 
hypothesis can be suggested based on the 
discussion above: 
H4: Banks’ growth has a significant negative 
influence on the dividend policy. 
 
2.2.5. Previous year’s dividend payment 
 
Dividend stability means there needs to be 
constancy in dividend payments. Prior research has 
proposed that managers normally favor a dividend 
that is stable more than one which fluctuates. 
Lintner (1956) analyzed managers’ motives and 
attitudes in relation to dividend policy. He examined 
the dividend decision-making process through 
follow-up interviews with 28 US managers and 
formulated a model in order to clarify changes in the 
dividend. Lintner tested his model for the period 
from 1918 to 1951. The results supported the 
conclusion reached from the interviews, that 
managers favor dividends that are stable and that 
slowly increase to the appropriate level of target 
dividend pay-out, and further, managers endeavor to 
avoid cuts in the dividend. The previous year’s 
dividend payment is regarded as the chief indicator 
of a company’s ability to pay out dividends (Lintner, 
1956) since it is presumed that the managers will 
strive to keep dividend policy stable. Moreover, the 
hypothesis of information asymmetry proposes that 
dividend policy is “sticky” or exhibits a tendency to 
stay at the previous dividends’ level (Baskin, 1989). 
Ahmed and Javid (2009) evaluated 320 non-financial 
firms in terms of their dynamics and determinants 
of dividend payout policy. The findings provided 
solid backing for the fact that firms depend on both 
past dividends per share and current earnings per 
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share in order to choose their dividend payments. 
Yet, the dividend is normally more susceptible to 
current earnings than previous dividends. Thus, a 
positive correlation between LDPS and the current 
year’s dividend is anticipated. The hypothesis that 
follows can be proposed in response to the 
discussion above: 
H5: Banks’ last year dividend has a significant 
positive influence on the dividend policy. 
 
3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
 
This research’s focus is on the investigation of the 
determinants of banking dividend policy in the G-7 
and GCC countries. When selecting which stocks to 
include, key criteria were if the stocks were listed in 
the GCC or G-7 stock markets as well as the 
availability of the required financial data (e.g., 
dividend per share, total assets and liabilities, net 
income and so on) regarding each bank. Due to the 
fact that stocks that did not meet the identified 
criteria were excluded, the sample is quite 
homogenous and therefore, the homogenous 
sampling approach is going to be followed (Saunders 
et al., 2012). The study’s sample was, therefore, able 
to include 621 banks listed in G-7 countries and 68 
banks listed in GCC countries.  
 
Table 1. Sample of the study 
 
GCC G-7 
Country Number Country Number 
Bahrain 10 Canada 9 
Kuwait 11 France 15 
Oman 8 France 11 
Qatar 9 Italy 18 
Saudi 
Arabia  
11 Japan 90 
United Arab 
Emirates 
19 
United 
Kingdom 
12 
United States 466 
Subtotal  68  621 
Total 689 
 
In order for the research to be conducted, we 
employed a huge volume of quantitative data and 
the primary source was Reuters Database. OLS 
regression analysis is employed for evaluating the 
relationship between variables using the Stata. A 
panel data OLS regression can be explained as: 
 
𝑦
i
 = 𝛽
0
 + 𝛽𝑥1+𝛽𝑥2 + …  + 𝛽𝑥n+ + 𝜖 (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is Y, explained by a 
constant (β
0
), and there is a particular relationship 
among the independent variables (x
n
). The error term 
(ε) encompasses the variance of the unobserved 
effects. Longitudinal, also referred to as a panel 
data, is when data is observed in a number of 
various periods and on the same units (Kennedy, 
2008). In this research, the financial information 
covers periods (2010-2015) regarding both G7 and 
GCC. For such panel data estimation methods need 
to be employed such as pooled ordinary least 
squares, the fixed effects model and random effects 
model. If no individual heterogeneity exists, i.e. 
there is no cross-sectional or time specific effect 
(ε=0), then ordinary least squares are able to provide 
consistent estimation to utilize panel data. If in the 
panel data, individual effects are not zero, 
heterogeneity can affect the assumption of 
homogeneity and non-autocorrelation (Kennedy, 
2008). Therefore, biased and inconsistent estimators 
may be provided by the model. If this occurs, the 
random and the fixed effects models provide 
avenues to deal with these issues. The variation 
between the random and fixed estimators and 
ordinary ones is that the generalized least squares 
estimator from the former will remain effective in 
the presence of heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation whilst the ordinary least squares will 
not. Using Breusch–Pagan test whose null hypothesis 
is ε=0 i.e. long-run homogeneity among the countries 
in the sample, the results show that H0 could be 
rejected. On this basis, the most suitable estimator 
is either random or fixed.  
To determine which estimation model suits the 
available data most appropriately, Hausman’s 
specification test is utilized in order to establish 
whether the fixed or random effect models are 
favorable. The result was in favor of using random 
effect estimator. Yet, Kennedy (2008) claimed that 
the random model can lead to reduced volatility and 
more accurate estimations than the fixed model. 
This is grounded in the fact that the random model 
uses the panel data’s information so that the 
independent variables’ influence on leverage can be 
emphasized. An additional advantage with the 
random model is that a lesser degree of freedom is 
lost as there are fewer parameters to estimate. 
 
4. RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The descriptive analysis in table 2 is based on the 
average value for each variable in each year for the 
two groups, i.e. G-7 and GCC countries. Regarding 
dividend payout policy, the table demonstrates that 
the dividend payout ratio (DPR) for the G-7 countries 
is lower than for the GCC countries in all periods of 
study, for example, the DPR for the G-7 countries is 
28.6% in comparison with 41.9% for GCC countries in 
2015. This clearly shows that the average DPR in the 
developed countries is lower compared with 
emerging countries. Two potential factors may 
explain this difference in the DPR. First, that the 
banks in the emerging countries have a higher 
growth rate, for example, the M/B ratio, which is 
measured by the opportunities for growth, is higher 
for the GCC countries. Second, banks profitability, 
measured by ROA, is higher in the GCC countries 
than G-7 countries, which makes the GCC banks 
more able to pay higher dividend payouts compared 
with the G-7 countries. Third, the leverage ratio for 
the GCC banks is lower in comparison to the G-7 
countries.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Analysis 
 
Group Year DPS$ DPR ROA 
M/B 
Ratio 
Leverage 
% 
Total 
Assets 
(m $) 
G-7 
2010 0.930 24.840 .555 1.019 89.876 66,868 
2011 1.261 23.447 .656 .830 90.198 72,135 
2012 1.415 24.981 .814 .977 90.068 75,228 
2013 1.526 25.915 .910 1.132 89.947 72,406 
2014 1.494 28.057 .947 1.105 89.723 70,415 
2015 .781 28.603 1.044 1.126 89.694 66,056 
GCC 
2010 .187 35.895 1.185 1.608 83.310 16,442 
2011 .177 36.436 1.654 1.418 82.944 17,891 
2012 .217 41.179 1.662 1.310 83.617 83.617 
2013 .193 36.284 1.615 1.566 83.541 21,931 
2014 .194 39.390 1.660 1.572 85.569 24,439 
2015 .185 41.915 1.476 1.220 85.887 26,050 
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A lower leverage ratio means less interest payment, 
which leads to a higher net profit available for 
dividend distribution. Lastly, Table 2 clearly shows 
that the G-7 banks are larger than GCC banks, for 
example, the average total assets for the G-7 banks 
in 2015 is $66 billion in comparison to $26 billion 
for the GCC banks in the same year. However, Table 
3 will analyze the correlation among the identified 
variables. 
Table 3 shows the level of correlation among 
the research factors. Relatively low correlation can 
be seen among the explanatory factors with the 
highest correlations are between size and leverage 
(.279 for G7 and .255 for GCC), size and last year 
DPR for G7 (.261) and ROA and size for GCC (.218). 
This indicates that there is no multi-collinearity 
problem in the samples. For robustness purposes, 
the researchers computed the variance inflation 
factors (VIF) for every independent factor as in table 
4. The results confirm what is found earlier, which is 
the absence of multi-collinearity issues with the VIF 
value of the whole factors being less than 1.4.
 
Table 3. Correlation matrix 
 
 
G7 GCC 
DPR Size ROA M/B Leverage 
Lag 
Leverage 
DPR Size ROA M/B Leverage 
Lag 
Leverage 
DPR 1      1      
Size .262 1     .095 1     
ROA .203 .026 1    .319 .218 1    
M/B .157 .003 .177 1   -.029 .081 .205 1   
Leverage -.099 .279 .217 .001 1  -.009 .255 -.078 .153 1  
Lag DPR .310 .261 .201 .181 .121 1 .298 .211 .195 .211 .174 1 
 
As per the result of Hausman test, we report 
and discuss the outcome of panel data regression 
with random effects to test the influence of banks’ 
size, leverage, profitability (ROA), growth (M/B ratio), 
and last year’s dividend on the dividend payout ratio 
(DPR) (H1- H5) in terms of all of the sample, G-7 and 
GCC. Standard errors (SD) are also computed, and 
asterisks are used to report the level of statistical 
significance for each independent factor. The results 
in Table 4 show that the influence of banks’ size on 
DPR is significant for the entire sample (β= 1.130, 
p<0.01) showing that larger banks pay higher 
dividends compared to smaller banks. Hence, H1 is 
supported. This association is also true for the G-7 
banks (β= 1.951, p<0.01) and is consistent with 
several empirical studies, for example, DeAngelo et 
al., (2006); Naceur et al., (2006); and Ajmi and 
Hussain (2011), whose results revealed that in 
comparison to smaller firms, bigger firms share a 
larger amount of their net profits via cash dividends. 
Moreover, Sawicki (2005) found that indirectly, 
dividend payouts can aid with the monitoring of 
managers’ performance in bigger firms. Thus, in 
bigger firms, information asymmetry rises because 
of the dispersion of ownership, reducing the 
capacity of shareholders to be able to regulate the 
firm’s internal and external activities. This leads to 
the insufficient supervision of management. The 
payment of large dividends can provide an answer to 
such an issue. That is because that a distributing a 
higher rate of dividends results in an increase in the 
necessity for an external funding, and the latter in 
turn leads to an extra monitoring applied on the 
borrowing firms by lenders (e.g., banks). Other 
research has indicated a positive relationship 
between firm size, dividends, and transaction costs. 
Holder et al., (1998), for example, revealed that 
bigger companies tend to have greater access to the 
capital markets and hence are able to raise funds at 
a reduced cost more easily, thus permitting them to 
pay larger dividends. This exemplifies a positive link 
among dividend pay-outs and the size of the firm. 
However, the result for the GCC banks was 
insignificant (β= 0.517, p>0.01), which indicates that 
the size of banks is an important dividend 
determinant in the G-7 countries but not the GCC 
countries. The latter, however, does not concur with 
the study of Abu-Manneh (2014) who found a 
significant positive influence of company size on 
DPR for companies listed on Abu Dhabi Stock 
Exchange (ADX). This inconsistency could be 
attributed to the fact that this study observed only 
non-financial companies, which is not the case in 
our study. 
 
Table 4. Random effects regression Analysis of 
Panel data 2010-2015 
 
The entire sample 
 Coef. SE P Level of Sig VIF 
Size 1.130 0.65 0.001 ** 1.12 
ROA 2.014 0.36 0.000 ** 1.21 
M/B 1.156 1.25 0.003 ** 1.11 
Leverage 
-
0.277 
3.63 0.000 ** 1.02 
Lag DPR 0.647 0.85 0.000 ** 1.30 
G-7 
 Coef. SE P Level of Sig VIF 
Size 1.951 0.83 0.009 ** 1.32 
ROA 1.867 0.45 0.000 ** 1.25 
M/B 1.363 2.75 0.001 ** 1.01 
Leverage 
-
0.228 
3.83 0.004 ** 0.99 
Lag DPR 0.650 0.65 0.000 ** 1.22 
GCC 
 Coef. SE P Level of Sig VIF 
Size 0.517 0.89 0.123  1.02 
ROA 3.702 0.64 0.001 ** 1.18 
M/B 
-
3.161 
2.13 0.042 * 1.12 
Leverage 
-
0.425 
4.1 0.036 * 1.01 
Lag DPR 0.581 0.34 0.000 ** 1.25 
Notes: SE - Standard errors. ** Significant at 1% level of 
significance and * Significant at 5% level of significance 
 
The results also clearly show that ROA, in both 
G-7 and GCC, has a significant positive impact on 
the DPR (β= 1.867 and β= 3.702 respectively with 
p<0.01) indicating that more profitable banks pay 
out higher dividends. The pecking order theory gives 
some reasons for the interconnection between 
dividend payout and profitability, as it takes into 
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account the cost relating to the issue of debt and 
equity financing Jensen et al. (1992). Firms that are 
less profitable find it harder to pay out dividends 
and, firms that are highly profitable are in a better 
position to generate funds to pay dividends and 
fund investments internally Myers and Majluf (1984). 
Lintner (1956) conducted research that involved 
consultation with 28 well-established US firms. He 
concluded that firms’ dividend patterns are affected 
by the current year’s profitability and the past year 
dividends. Pruitt and Gitman (1991) did a survey 
with US firms’ financial managers and established 
that profits have an impact on dividend pay-out.  
If investments are profitable, a company which 
experiences growth from investments tends to pay 
reduced dividends and pay securities dividends 
instead since it focuses on profit retention for 
funding its ventures. The residual theory proposes 
that companies with larger opportunities for growth 
have a low dividend payout ratio in comparison to 
firms with limited or no growth. Such companies 
usually decide to keep as much as they can of their 
annual earnings as retained profit for meeting the 
financial demands of their investments. In table 4, 
the results for the GCC banks show a negative 
impact of the M/B ratio on DPR (β= -3.161, p<0.05) 
as hypothesized. This means that banks in GCC with 
a high M/B ratio are overvalued in the market. That 
happens usually when investors are willing to pay 
more for than what those banks are actually worth 
in terms of book value (net assets) due to higher 
rates of growth. This itself acts as a motivation for 
expansion through investing in more projects. The 
result is also in line with the life-cycle theory that is 
banked at the growth stage of their lifecycle usually 
possess less retained earnings or experience a cash 
flow problem, therefore they are not able to share 
more dividends with their shareholders. On the 
other hand, the results of the G-7 banks show a 
positive impact of the M/B ratio (β= 1.363, p<0.01), 
which is inconsistent with the hypothesis H4. This 
finding could be justified by the fact that these 
banks might be using the dividend pay-out to 
indicate to the market regarding their growth and 
future investments, as according to the signaling 
theory. Banks operating in a market with an 
extremely high level of competition, such as G7, 
tend to pay a higher rate of dividends during the 
period of high financial performance to encourage 
more investors to demand their shares as well as the 
current shareholders to stay. They do that as a 
means to indicate their high performance to the 
market. 
Regarding the leverage variable, table 4 clearly 
revealed that leverage has a significant negative 
influence on the dividend pay-out in both G-7 and 
GCC banks (β= -0.228, p<0.01 and β= -0.425, p<0.05 
respectively). As a bank that is highly leveraged is 
anticipated to return increased amounts in order to 
reinforce its equity base. Highly levered banks have 
increased debt and interest demands to meet, 
therefore, they are open to a higher potential of 
paying out a lower ratio of dividend pay-out. In 
accordance with Jensen (1986), the reason why firms 
that are highly leveraged pay a reduced ratio of pay-
out is that these firms are overseen by debt holders 
who decrease the power of management to pay out 
dividends. Further, Jensen proposed that levered 
companies can take the dividend payout ratio from 
the sum of agency costs. This is consistent with the 
research of Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak (2015) who reported 
results in terms of non-financial companies listed on 
Warsaw Stock Exchange. Lastly, the lagged dividend 
pay-outs are proven to have a significant and 
positive influence on the current level of dividend 
(β= 0.650 and β= 0.581 respectively with p<0.01), 
which is consistent with partial adjustment models. 
As these models originate from the life-cycle theory, 
which suggests that companies actually smooth 
dividends in the same way as earnings smoothing. 
The result is consistent with the research of Pal and 
Goyal (2007) who observed the dividend policy of 
banks listed on National Stock Exchange (NSE) of 
India. 
Overall, the results of the regression analysis 
were similar in both G7 (with capital gains tax) and 
GCC (without capital gains tax) samples except for 
the factor of company size that was insignificant 
regarding GCC. This finding is consistent with a 
recent study by Khan et al. (2017) who reported that 
dividend tax does not significantly affect the 
dividend policy of companies, however, their study 
was restricted only to non-financial companies listed 
on Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
Dividend policy is seen as one of the most 
significant decisions in relation to corporate finance 
as it affects choices in this area of decision-making. 
Since the 1950s, dividend payouts have been subject 
to investigation, starting with Lintner (1956), who 
first suggested dividend adjustments or partial 
adjustments. Numerous threads of literature have 
tried to provide explanations of dividend payouts, 
for instance, irrelevance theorem, signalling 
dividend theory, agency and life-cycle theories 
(Miller and Modigliani, 1958; Gordon, 1959; Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Bhattachary, 1979; Rozeff, 1982; Grullon et al., 
2002). Dividend policy within the banking sector is 
increasingly complex where there are numerous 
parties involved. Regarding the principle side, there 
are creditors, shareholders, and depositors. On the 
agent side, there are also regulators and internal 
managers as well as the whole of society who are 
open to any grave repercussion due to banks’ 
failures. 
Recent research also analyzed various 
company-specific factors that could influence levels 
of dividend policy (Gugler, 2003; Naceur et al., 2006; 
Ansary and Gomaa, 2012). Of the standard factors 
examined, there are firm size, profitability, growth 
and life-cycle measures, with mixed results reported 
regarding these. Using a panel regression model, this 
study has tried to determine the factors affecting 
the GCC and G-7 banking sector’s dividend policies, 
namely, banks’ size, profitability, growth, leverage, 
and the last year’s dividend. The results of the 
current study indicate that the dividend payout ratio 
for the G-7 countries was lower than GCC countries 
in every year during the period of study (2010-2015), 
for example, the DPR for the G-7 countries it was 
28.6% in comparison to 41.9% for GCC countries in 
2015. In addition, GCC banks demonstrated higher 
growth opportunity and profitability, while G-7 
banks had higher leverage and a larger size. 
Furthermore, the findings of the regression analysis 
indicated that banks’ size in the G-7 sample had a 
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significant positive impact on the DPR, showing that 
larger banks paid out higher dividends compared 
with smaller banks, while banks’ size in the GCC 
sample was insignificant indicating that banks’ size 
is an important dividend determinant in the G-7 
countries only. Moreover, banks’ profitability was 
shown to have a significant positive impact on the 
DPR, indicating that banks that are more profitable 
pay higher dividends, and the profitability results 
held for both G-7 and GCC banks. Consequently, it 
can be said that banks’ leverage has a significant 
negative impact on the dividend pay-out in both G-7 
and GCC banks. In addition, the last year’s dividend 
always has a significant positive influence on the 
banking dividend payout policy. 
This study has both theoretical and practical 
relevance. Given the important gap existing in the 
dividend literature related to the banking sector, this 
study helps in minimizing such a gap both 
empirically and theoretically. It helps in providing an 
up-to-date discussion regarding the status of 
dividend policies in emerging economies i.e. GCC in 
comparison to the developed world i.e. G-7. For 
managers, our results are helpful in improving their 
understanding of the process of dividend decision 
making which might lead to better-informed 
decisions. Furthermore, such a study is useful for 
current and potential investors who are always 
interested in the behavior of banks’ dividend 
payouts which is often complex to grasp.  
Similar to previous studies, our research has 
limitations. As banking itself is a crucial area, there 
are a number of factors that need to be considered, 
such as regulation and default risk. Such factors 
were not employed in this study and therefore, it is 
to be anticipated that studies in the future may 
focus on them. Additionally, the study sample can 
be expanded to encompass, for example, banking 
firms from Asia, Africa, and other developed 
countries. This could provide a fascinating 
comparative analysis especially if they are in similar 
stages of development. This research needs to be 
extended also to include additional portfolios of the 
banks. The existing banking literature has not yet 
examined how competition affects dividend pay-out, 
and thus, the risks associated with this. Diverse 
literature exists that discusses the connection 
between the risk-taking, competition, and stability of 
the banking sector, yet the correlation between 
competition, risk, and dividend payout have not 
previously been studied. Hence, further research 
should expand on the analysis of the influence of 
competition with regard to the dividend payout 
levels in the banking sector. 
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